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INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY:




There is currently very little federal control over the safety and
health of working men and women in American industry.' The
Federal Government's major role with respect to working condi-
tions has been provided by the safety provisions of the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act.2 These provisions require
that work performed under federal contracts covered by the Act
3
be free from unsanitary conditions, and that such work not be
hazardous or dangerous to the health and safety of employees.
However, the vitality of that Act is severely sapped by its provi-
sion that compliance with state safety regulations, which are often
inadequate, shall be prima facie evidence of compliance with the
Act. 4 Beyond the Walsh-Healey coverage, federal statutes pro-
vide only limited additional coverage of the civilian work force. 5
* Mr. Harrison is a member of the Editorial Board of PROSPECTUS.
1 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which was enacted under the federal commerce
power, included important child labor and maximum hours provisions which undoubt-
edly contributed to industrial safety. However, the Act was silent with respect to the
regulation of working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 80 (1938).
241 U.S.C. § 35 (1936).
3 Id. Sec. l(a) limits the coverage of the act to contracts for the manufacture or furnishing
of materials, supplies, articles or equipment which exceed $10,000 in value. Section 9
further restricts coverage by exempting any purchase usually obtainable on the open
market, firsthand purchases of agricultural products and other perishables, and com-
mon carriers or carriage of freight or personnel where published tariff rates are in
effect. President Johnson reported that only about one-half of the labor force was
covered by Walsh-Healy, and only part of the time. 26 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Vol.
XXVI, No. 9, Feb. 23, 1968 at 318.
4 Id. Sec. I(e).
5 The Secretary of Labor has broader regulatory powers under 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1958),
amending Sec. 41 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act
(33 U.S.C. § 941 (1927)). The Secretary's powers are similar to his Walsh-Healy
powers under the National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. § 951-963). The Service Contract Act of 1965 (41 U.S.C. § 351) gives the
Federal Government the power to cancel contracts, in the case of services contracted
for in excess of $2,500, which do not meet the "reasonable limitations" of the
Secretary of Labor, with respect to safety and health requirements (Sec. 4(b)). Where
the Walsh-Healy Act applies, however, the McNamara-O'Hara Act does not. Again,
transportation exemptions, similar to the Walsh-Healy exemptions, are in effect. The
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The Secretary of Labor possesses the power to regulate work-
ing conditions of federal employees under the Federal Employ-
ee's Compensation Act.6 However, until quite recently, it has not
been seriously proposed that the Federal Government regulate
industrial safety to the full extent of its commerce power. Such a
proposal was made by the Johnson Administration in the
form of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968. 7 This
bill, while never enacted into law, stirred up a great deal of
confusion and controversy. In its aftermath, it left a wealth of
information which should afford a better understanding of what
ought to be the federal role in this area.
The proponents of such a pervasive federal law generally argue
that there are simply too many industrial deaths and injuries to
further ignore such legislation. President Johnson's statement of
January 26, 1968, in support of his proposal, relied heavily upon
the absolute number of annual industrial deaths and injuries. 8
This crusading spirit dominated the statements of former Secre-
tary of Labor Willard Wirtz before the Senate Subcommittee on
Labor:
Every single minute we talk, 18 to 20 people
are going to be hurt severely enough that they
will have to leave their jobs, and a good many
of them will never come back because they
won't be able to.9
But Secretary Wirtz went beyond this statistical approach with
his suggestion that reliance upon injury figures was demeaning to
only other acts currently providing for safety regulation are the Vocational Rehabili-
tation Act (Amendments of 29 U.S.C. § 31-33) which provides for regulation of
workshops and rehabilitation facilities, and the recent bill (H.R. 10946) signed by
President Nixon on August 9, 1969 providing for regulation of safety and health
conditions under federally financed construction projects. P.L. 91-54.
6 U.S.C. § 8101 (1916).
7 President Nixon, in a message to Congress on August 6, 1969, proposed similar legisla-
tion. Both bills will be discussed in detail, infra, in the context of the author's
proposals for federal action. With respect to the Nixon proposal, see 50 CCH LAB.
L. REP. Aug. 12, 1969; New York Times Aug. 7, 1969, at 1; and 27 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP., no 32, Aug. 8, 1969 at 1468.
8 CONG. R. WEEKLY REP., Feb. 23, 1968 at 318, TIME concluded a recent article on this
subject with the statement: "Every month that the acrimonious debate [concerning
expansive federal industrial safety legislation] drags on ... another 1,100 U.S. work-
ers will die." Industrial Safety: The Toll of Neglect, TIME, Feb. 7, 1969 at 76.
9 Hearings on S. 2864, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968, Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 90th
Cong. 2nd Sess. 60-93 (1968). Statement of Hon. W. Willard Wirtz.
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our humanity; as long as there were any needless industrial acci-
dents, there would be sufficient justification for federal action.' 0
The opponents of federal action have failed to rebut Wirtz's
condemnation of the statistical approach, and have, instead, ad-
vanced equally emotional arguments. Further intervention of the
Federal Government into an area which the business community
regards as within the traditional bailiwick of private interests and
local government is decried as anathema." Opponents reject the
conclusion that those currently responsible for industrial safety
have not done a good job, and that extensive federal regulation
could do more than merely undermine state efforts.'
2
Both sides have used data when it has supported any of their
arguments. In fact, the published reports of both Senate and
House hearings on the 1968 Occupational Safety and Health Act
are replete with statistical information. Unfortunately, neither in
these reports nor anywhere else has an attempt been made to
analyze thoroughly the available information. Such an analysis is
a prerequisite to a determination of the proper federal role in the
area of industrial safety.
Reliance on emotional argumentation will not suffice to provide
satisfactory answers. Injury data must be examined and inter-
preted. The best indication of the degree of danger to which a
worker is subjected is the "injury frequency rate" which tells us
how often injuries occur.' 3 Since the primary concern is pre-
vention of injuries, the number of occurrences is more important
in this analysis than the severity of the injuries. The author has,
therefore, not based any conclusions upon an analysis of "injury
severity rates.' 4
10 Id.
11 Id. The idea that the Labor Secretary could become a "virtual safety czar" has fright-
ened businessmen. Life or Death for Your Business, NATION'S BUSINESS, April,
1968, reprinted at 792-796.
12 Id. See also the Prepared Statement of Thomas D. Nyhan on behalf of the Illinois State
Chamber of Commerce, at 712-713.
13 The "injury frequency rate" is the number of disabling work injuries for each million
man-hours worked. A "disabling work injury" is an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment, which results in death, permanent total disability, or tempora-
ry total disability. The term "injury" includes occupational disease. See STATE OF
NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, BUREAU OF ENGINEERING AND
SAFETY, WORK INJURIES IN NEW JERSEY INDUSTRY, 1966, at 15. All states reporting
injury frequency rates to the Bureau of Labor Statistics use these definitions in
compiling their data.
14 Id. The "injury severity rate" is the average number of days lost as a result of disabling
work injuries for each million man-hours worked.
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Available injury frequency rates are somewhat unreliable and
therefore misleading. This unreliability, however, stems mainly
from underreporting by employers.1 5 Thus, one should not con-
clude that the situation is perhaps better than the data would
indicate. In all other respects the data presented in this study
were compiled and presented by state labor departments in a
uniform manner. As a result, a meaningful comparison between
sets of frequency rate data can be made.
16
It is the purpose of this article to raise and answer these
questions: (1) Is the current level of injury frequency on the job
unsatisfactory? (2) If so, can this level of injury frequency be
reduced through more effective industrial safety regulation? (3)
To what extent and for what reasons have existing regulatory
programs, both public and private, succeeded in reducing fre-
quency rates? (4) In what manner, if at all, should the Federal
Government extend its regulation of industrial safety?
An affirmative answer to the first two questions is preliminary
to the other inquiries. It will be worthwhile to proceed to a
discussion of alternative courses of action only if we are con-
vinced that further reduction of industrial hazards to health and
safety is both necessary and possible. The author concludes here-
in that both questions are to be answered in the affirmative.
These conclusions require a thorough examination of the third
question. If present methods of regulation under existing regu-
latory programs, be they governmental or private, are proceeding
in an adequate manner toward the achievement of satisfactory
levels of occupational safety, then there would be little justifica-
tion for additional federal activity.
However, the author concludes that this is not the case and
15 Hearings on S. 2864, supra note at 9, Statements of Ralph Nader, at 510, and Prof.
Gerome Gordon, Columbia U., at 547. The testimony of these witnesses indicated a
possible 10 to 20% undernumeration in annual injury frequency rates by industries
reporting to state agencies. Reports on injuries covered by workmen's compensation
are, on the other hand, accurate. We will treat the reported injury frequency rates as
accurate, with the proviso that, if anything, they are too low, and that inconsistencies
in the degree of underreporting from state to state and industry to industry may
weaken the accuracy of comparisons.
16 The injury rate data presented in this study were compiled under the American Standard




that current regulatory activities are inadequate. The fourth ques-
tion is thus concerned with two remaining inquiries: (a) Would it
be nonetheless advisable to attempt to modify existing programs
rather than to attempt a federal remedy? (b) If not, what sort of
general program for federal regulation should be instituted?
II. Current Status of Industrial Safety
A. The Present Level of Injury Frequency
The national average injury frequency rate for all manufac-
turing was 15.3 in 195 1.17 The Bureau of Labor Statistics report-
ed that by 1958 this rate had dropped to 11.9. By 1965 it had,
however, risen again to 12 .8.1.8 Whether these rates are accept-
able will be discussed below. We should note that these averages
conceal a very relevant point. Some industries are either inher-
ently very safe and require no regulation at all, or have excellent
safety records for other reasons, while other industries are more
dangerous and their injury frequency rates reflect this fact. For
example, the twenty-five industries with the worst average fre-
quency rates from 1958 to 1965 ranged from 23.6 for fabricated
structural steel to 58.8 for logging camps.1 9 The worst seventeen
industries had rates in excess of 30.2. Again, these are nationwide
averages within a particular industry, and do not reflect the wide
variation in rates among reporting units.
Furthermore, there are wide disparities between the states,
even in their average rates for all manufacturing. In 1967, for
example, the available rates ranged from 8.0 in South Carolina to
41.5 in Wyoming.20 These variations will be explained below, but
it should be clear that sufficient variation exists in reported rates
to call into question the value of national averages in determining
the need for regulation.
17 A Bureau of Labor Statistics (B.L.S.) statistic, reprinted in MAINE INDUSTRIAL IN-
JURIES, 1951.
18 Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 9. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, Bulletin no. 1555, 1967; reprinted at
139-161.
19 Id. Table of industries, named and ranked at 560.
20 See Table 8, App. A.
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B. A Proposed Frequency Rate Goal
The isolated examination of injury frequency rates will not
reveal whether anything needs to be done to reduce these rates.
Recognizing that workers must assume different degrees of risk in
different industries and in different occupations, it follows that
ideal rates must vary accordingly. A determination of frequency
rate goals for each industry would require an analysis of industrial
conditions which is beyond the scope of this article. However, in
determining the need for regulation of industrial safety, the estab-
lishment of goals in the form of minimum acceptable levels of
injury frequency offers a valuable approach.
The Federal Government has already adopted this approach to
a limited extent in the Mission Safety-70 program for large federal
agencies. 21 Goal rates have been established and tied to a time
limit for achievement. For example, in the Post Office, which is
the largest federal agency, the 1966 frequency rate was 14.4, and
the goal to be achieved by 1970 is 13.2.22 Presumably, the goal
will be reevaluated in 1970. It must be re-emphasized, however,
that this article cannot attempt to set ideal goals for specific
industries. Nonetheless, it seems necessary to determine an ac-
ceptable level of injury frequency for American industry in gener-
al in order to gain an appropriate perspective of the magnitude of
danger on the job.
Table 1 in Appendix A presents a comparison of frequency
rates for all workers in 1967 according to the type of activity in
which they were involved. The table shows that frequency rates
on the job were about twice as high as in the home for these
workers. It is understandable that a worker might be more likely
to be injured on the job than at home in that he is likely to be
more active on the job.
One is tempted to justify any on-the-job frequency rate on the
ground that a worker voluntarily subjects himself to that degree of
danger. Such a justification assumes that a worker has complete
freedom of job choice and, furthermore, that he is aware of the
21 U.S. WAGES AND LABOR STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, SAFETY
ENGINEERING AND PROGRAM SERVICES-FISCAL YEAR 1967, at 15, (Injury fre-
quency rate data are from the Bureau of Employees' Compensation.)
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danger to which he is subjecting himself. However, these assump-
tions are unwarranted. Rather, the danger level which a worker
finds acceptable is more likely to be reflected by what he does of
his own free will off the job. A significant amount of his
away-from-work time, however, is spent in motor vehicles. Since
transportation is a necessity, one cannot attribute to the worker
any satisfaction with the danger level on the highway, which
appears from table I in Appendix A to be, on the average, a
greater hazard to the worker than his job. Thus, the only degree
of danger to which a worker voluntarily subjects himself is that
degree of danger which exists in the home. This provides the
most accurate indication of the danger level, as reflected by fre-
quency rates, that he would find acceptable on the job.
23
Accordingly, it seems realistic to set as a general goal the
degree of safety in the home, which in 1967 was a 7.1 frequency
rate. Any industrial frequency rate approximating or below this
rate would certainly be satisfactory. But what is the maximum
acceptable injury frequency rate? This point is one upon which
reasonable men could differ, and the rate clearly would vary
among industries. These maximum rates should be determined
after careful study by safety planners. However, to the extent that
higher rate goals are deemed acceptable, we are compromising
our desire to obtain more safety with the recognition that the
industry involved is hazardous. Dangers inherent to an industry
should not be overlooked; attempts must be made to eliminate
them, even at the expense of extensive reorganization of produc-
tion methods. In general, therefore, the goal should be to make
on-the-job conditions as safe as those to which a worker volun-
tarily exposes himself in his home.
C. The Need for Improvement
With respect to these general goals, the most recent data show
a clearly unacceptable rate of injury frequency. The national
23 It must be reiterated, however, that since he may be more active on the job, and may be
involved in an occupation with some degree of inherent risk to his safety, the worker
may expect that his job will be more dangerous. Indeed, he may regard this factor as
a part of the justification for his compensation. Regardless of the workers' ex-
pectations, it must be conceded that some occupations, such as construction or




average for all manufacturing indicates that accidents occur about
twice as often on the job as at home. 24 The national average for
the worst twenty-five industries was far from acceptable. A
glance at table 8 in Appendix A reveals that in manufacturing
industries, only one reporting state, South Carolina, had an aver-
age rate low enough to indicate that there are probably no
more than a relatively small number of the state's reporting units
in which significant improvement is necessary. 25 The rest of the
states have frequency rate averages which indicate that much
improvement will be required in order to reach the suggested rate
goal. It must be reiterated that the averages merely indicate the
probable proportion of units which already have fairly acceptable
rates. The spread in rates is quite high in every state. Table 2 in
Appendix A shows a typical example of how rates vary according
to two factors: industry and unit size.
The implications of table 2 are clear. (1) Even in those industri-
al classifications with the best safety records, there are units and
size classifications of units which require improvement. (2) Very
few of the industrial classifications have acceptable averages
for all reporting units. In short, most industries and portions of
industries have alarming records relative to our general safety
goals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that table 2 presents data
for a state with a better-than-average frequency rate for all manu-
facturing.
26
III. Factors Influencing Injury Rates
A reasonable introductory proposition is that industrial safety
ought to be regulable to as great an extent as any other human
activity. This section will, however, examine: (a) the immediate
24 
See Table 1, App. A.
2 With an average frequency rate of 8.0, clearly at least one-half of the workers are
working at a safety level close to our goal in South Carolina. However, there may still
be a considerable number of plants with much higher frequency rates. Apparently,
this would not be a very great proportion of the total. In fact, in 1967, 5% of the
workers were in industrial units employing 5-50 workers. The average frequency rate
in this group was 18.8. The rate was 21.3 in the 5 1-100 employee group, another 5%
of the work force. Therefore, a significant improvement in the average frequency rate
would seem to be called for in South Carolina manufacturing units employing some
10% of the manufacturing work force. See, S.C. DEPT. OF LABOR, S.C. WORK
INJURIES, 1967, at 3.
26 See Table 9, App. A.
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causes of injuries to see if there might be some agencies, in-
struments or other causes inherently insusceptible to regulation,
(b) external economic factors influencing the level of injury fre-
quency and the extent to which they might hamper attempts to
reduce frequency rates, and (c) the effect of unit size upon the
ability of management to regulate safety within the unit.
A. The Agencies, or Immediate Causes, of Injuries
1. Carelessness
Any discussion of the causes of accidents must be tempered by
the realization that the precise cause of a particular accident will
often be difficult to identify.
2 7
Nonetheless, one argument against increasing government
regulation, and particularly against the entry of the Federal Gov-
ernment into this area, posits that carelessness is a primary
source of industrial accidents. Therefore, the argument continues,
education aimed at encouraging workers to perform their func-
tions in a safer manner, rather than increased regulation, is re-
quired. The minority report of the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, which rejected the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1968 and eventually carried the day, stressed the
following point:
There is no reason to believe that federal
controls would materially reduce the rate of
such accidents or injuries. Safety authorities
have estimated that three-quarters of acci-
dents on the job result from unsafe acts rath-
er than unsafe conditions.28
27 Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 9. Statement of A.C. Blackman, Secretary and Manag-
ing Director of the American Society of Safety Engineers at 216. Mr. Blackman
points out that any accident is a complex occurrence.
When an accident does occur, it is extremely difficult
and in many cases almost impossible to isolate any one
single factor which could be said to be 'the cause' of the
accident and the resulting injury. Usually there are a
number of factors each of which could have contributed
to some extent to the final result. In many cases, the
elimination of any one of these factors would have pre-
vented the accident and the resulting injury.
28 H.R. REP. No. 1720, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. at 45 (minority report).
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The accuracy of (a) this estimate of the pervasiveness of care-
lessness, and (b) the assumption that carelessness is not regulable,
is open to serious question.
(a) Pennsylvania is one of the few states which has published
an analysis of the causes of the state's industrial injury ex-
perience. The results of that study indicate that carelessness is
probably a significant factor in industrial accidents. With respect
to an analysis of the general causes of accidents, the following
statement was made:
Similar to earlier years, unsafe acts and con-
ditions produced between 95 and 96 per cent
of all disabling injuries in 1967. Again, the
acts of using equipment unsafely and unnec-
essary exposure to danger prevailed and
caused 84.0 per cent of all accidents.
29
At least 26 per cent of these accidents are directly attributable to
carelessness. 3 0 Beyond that figure, however, the degree of impor-
tance of carelessness was indeterminable. 3 ' Another Pennsylva-
nia study, entitled "leading agencies involved," pointed out that
vehicles were the leading agency (or instrument, as opposed to
cause) involved in non-fatal (13.9%) and fatal (33%) injuries.
32
What might be referred to as "pure carelessness" was that cate-
gory in which the persons themselves constituted the agency
causing the injuries. This category ranked tenth (2.4%) in
non-fatal cases, and second (14.4%) in fatal cases.
While these data indicate that carelessness is a significant cause
of accidents, they nonetheless call into question the sweeping
estimate made by the House Labor and Education Committee
minority.
(b) Moreover, the relevance of the degree to which care-
lessness is attributed to accident causation must be seriously
questioned. First, it is clear that most accidents in some way or
another involve an agency other than the person himself, such as
a machine or a vehicle. Second, it is easy to conclude that since
29 BUREAU OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, PA. DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUSTRY, SUMMARY:
WORK INJURIES IN PA., 1967, Nov. 1968, at I.
30 Id. at 4. Unnecessary exposure to danger, 23.6%; failure to use safety or protective
devices, 2.4%.





an accident occurred, this agency was not properly used, and
hence there was "carelessness." Thus, it is too easy to conclude
that carelessness caused the accident even though it might no-
netheless have been prevented if the agency itself had been de-
signed to better protect the user.
It is important to remember that human beings cannot and will
not work with computer-like efficiency. Much can be done to
avoid "carelessness" by simply improving the safety character-
istics of the agencies themselves. A "safe" machine is one which
minimizes both the possibility of careless use and the possibility
that careless operation will result in an injury. It follows that safer
machines will reduce injury rates even in areas where the injury
had been attributed to employee carelessness.
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the psychological aspects
of carelessness are susceptible to regulatory techniques which
could significantly reduce injury rates. Some existing state pro-
grams already deal with this facet of the problem. For example,
the New Jersey Bureau of Engineering and Safety, Department of
Labor and Industry, publishes a series of safety promotion bulle-
tins, entitled STAY ALERT-STAY ALIVE. Forty-six of these bulle-
tins were published and distributed in appropriate working units
from April 1960 to November 1965. They contained case his-
tories of accidents and provided safety lessons to be learned from
these examples. The New Jersey State Industrial Safety Com-
mittee also sponsors a safety contest replete with eleven annual
awards dinners. The firms with the best safety records are hon-
ored at the dinners.
It is difficult to assess the efficacy of such programs. It is
equally difficult, however, to avoid the conclusion that there is
something which can be done, within a regulatory scheme, to deal
with the psychological aspects of safety, and to promote training
in safe operations procedures. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
believe that strict requirements on this level would have a marked
impact.
Thus far the implementation of such techniques has been left,
for the most part, to private initiative. Under the present regu-
latory system, the obligation of the company to conduct such
safety activities is simply a moral obligation. Yet, where a com-
pany has shown an interest in promoting safety in this manner, its
December 19691
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program has been generally effective.3 3 For example, Aluminum
Company of America had an injury frequency rate of only
about 2.2 in 1966, during 90 million man-hours of work in its
twenty-six plants. This exceptional effort is largely due to Alcoa's
program of safety-consciousness:
Alcoa seems determined to make employees
more safety conscious. A foreman with elev-
en years' experience at the company's Cleve-
land Plant recently was discharged for violat-
ing a safety regulation.... Before a new em-
ployee starts work at an Alcoa plant, the
company sends a letter to his wife or parents,
urging them to remind him to work safely.3 4
It seems reasonable, in light of the Alcoa experience, to con-
clude that regulation of the psychological aspect of carelessness is
not inherently impossible, and that it may well produce beneficial
results.
2. Other Agencies
It is even more clear that the use of the agents themselves,
whether they be machines, toxic chemicals, or other in-
strumentalities, can be effectively regulated. This point has never
been seriously questioned. Regulation of this aspect of the prob-
lem simply requires research and findings as to the best means of
minimizing the hazards associated with particular agents.
B. Anti-Regulatory Economic Factors
This section will examine the possibility that there are external
economic factors, not directly related to industrial safety, which
may nonetheless make regulation impossible. Two economic fac-
tors might have a significant adverse impact upon safety condi-
tions in industry: (1) technological advance, and (2) high levels of
economic activity. These terms, of course, cover broad categories
of problems and economic effects.
1. Technological Improvements
Technological improvements in production techniques and the
increasing level of mechanization in industry have made the regu-
33 See "The Relation of Unit Size to the Success of Regulation Activities," in text at 185.
34 Vienna, Safety Setback, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1967, at 24. col. I.
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lation of industrial safety more difficult. As more complex ma-
chinery is introduced into industrial process, the number of new
types of possible industrial accidents increases.
The kinds of machinery, equipment and
buildings have changed drastically in the last
fifty years, machines have become more com-
plex, processes have changed, requiring a
great deal less manual effort on the part of the
individual, but a far greater knowledge of the
machine or process which in turn requires a
great deal more education on the part of the
operator. 35
Problems have arisen with respect to occupational health which
are worthy of note. One infamous example is the increase of
pneumoconiosis ("black lung") among coal miners resulting from
automation in the coal mines. However, problems abound with
respect to toxic chemicals in general:
According to estimates of the U.S. Public
Health Service, every twenty minutes a new
and potentially toxic chemical is introduced
into some industrial process. If such a chem-
ical did have an adverse effect on human
beings, this is usually determined later, after
it has been used, and people get ill or die.
3 6
These examples of the effect of technological advance upon oc-
cupational safety suggest that viable regulation is difficult. But
there is no reason to believe that effective regulation is impossible
in the face of technological improvements. Rather, these exam-
ples merely suggest that safety regulation must not fail to contin-
ually anticipate and adapt to future needs.
3 7
There are frequent complaints that technological advances en-
tail prohibitive costs with respect to the development and manu-
facture of safety devices which should accompany them. In-
asmuch as the public interest is served by adopting these devices,
public subsidization in appropriate cases does not seem out of line
with a forward-looking safety regulation program.
s Blackman, supra note 27 at 216.
36 Remarks of George H.R. Taylor, AFL-CIO Economist, before the 50th Annual Indus-
trial Health Conference of the Section on Occupational Medicine, New York Acade-
my of Medicine, Princeton, N.J., June 17, 1966, at 5.
37 For a complete discussion of standards lag and revision procedures, see WAGE AND
LABOR STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, STATUS OF SAFETY
STANDARDS, 1968, at 1-9.
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2. The General Level of Economic Activity
Another anti-regulatory economic factor of considerable impor-
tance is the level of economic activity. Statistics reveal that there
has been a generally increasing level of injury frequenty corre-
sponding to the economic boom of the 1960's.38 The best state-
ment of the relevance of this factor has been provided by Dr.
Howard A. Rusk:
The continuing boom in our economy with
the highest levels of employment in our his-
tory has been accompanied by a sharp in-
crease in working accidents.... As the labor
supply has declined and production schedules
increased, employers have been forced to
hire more inexperienced personnel. This has
led to more accidents. Other accidents occur
when workers are fatigued from working
overtime or from moon-lighting.
39
At least one other commentator has found that "companies gener-
ally agree that inexperience is a prime cause behind the rise in
on-the-job injuries." 40 Again, this factor will make the regulatory
task more difficult. Yet one searches in vain for any reason why
intense economic activity should render regulation impossible.
The problem of overtime and fatigue may increase the possibility
of human error. However, it should be re-emphasized that ade-
quate safety devices and safely designed machines can nonethe-
less reduce the probability that error will result in accidents and
injuries. The same is true with respect to inexperience. All work-
ers are inexperienced in their jobs at one time or another. Proper
education and training of the inexperienced worker should have
lasting influence on injury rates, regardless of the proportion of
inexperienced workers in the labor force at any given time.
In short, while both of the factors discussed in this section
render regulation more difficult, they do not alter the nature of the
regulatory task so as to make regulation impossible. Rather, they
merely act to contribute to occupational hazards, increasing the
38 See Table 4, App. A.
39 Rusk, Industrial Accidents, New York Times, Sept. 1, 1968. at 55. This effect is noted
also by W. Wirtz, supra note 10 at 63, and by Commissioner R. RICCUTi, SAFETY
NEWS AND VIEWS, CONN. LABOR DEPT., Sept. 1968.
40 Vienna, supra note 34 at 24.
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necessity of improved regulation. These factors should be viewed
as additional reasons for increased regulatory activity.
C. The Relation of Unit Size to the
Success of Regulation Activities
On the basis of the above discussion it can be fairly concluded
that industrial safety is susceptible to regulation. Experience
bears out this conclusion. If, within each industry, firms with
larger plants (according to the number of employees) consistently
have better safety records, it follows that this result is the effect
of regulatory activities. The reason for this conclusion should be
clear. The plant-size factor is not akin to the anti-regulatory
economic factors discussed above; there is no inherent reason
why variation of plant size should cause conditions to be more or
less hazardous. In other words, there is no real evidence of safety
"economies" or "diseconomies" of scale. It seems fair to con-
clude that throughout a given industry, the inherent danger level
associated with a given job will be the same regardless of the size
of the plant. If a large plant is safer, it is because management has
made it safer through regulatory activities.
Table 2 in Appendix A indicates that the largest firms (the
firms with the most employees) in each industry had average
frequency rates which were satisfactory in most cases. Further-
more, those firms' rates were well below the highest rates for their
respective industry, and always below the average for the entire
industry. It must be emphasized that Virginia's experience in this
regard was not atypical. Diagram I shows that there is a con-
sistent pattern among the various states insofar as the largest
firms invariably have the best average frequency rates. Further-
more, these rates are clearly acceptable according to the ultimate
goals which we have suggested.
It is not difficult to understand why the large employer general-
ly enjoys a much better safety record than the small em-
ployer. To the extent that the employer saves money on hiring,
training and workmen's compensation, among other costs, by
reducing injury rates, an employer would find it economically
beneficial to reduce the number of accidents or occupational
diseases in his plant. For the small employer, however, the cost of
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safety programs may be prohibitive. On the other hand, the large
employer can, and in fact does, do more to reduce injury fre-
quency rates.
It is well established that the large employer
enjoys lower accident rates than the small
employer. Available statistics show that
two-thirds of all industrial injuries occur in
businesses with fewer than one hundred
workers. The superior performance of the
large employer is probably due to his greater
financial ability to provide safe environmental
factors, expert management, and staff special-
ists such as the safety engineer.
42
Diagram I
Injury Rates by Size of Unit for All Manufacturing,
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41 For the precise data, and data for South Carolina and Virginia, see Table 3, App. A.
42 Hedian, Incidence: A New Tool for Accident Analysis, SAFETY MAINTENANC9 MAGA-
ZINE, May 1968, at 11-12.
[Vol. 3:1
Industrial Safety
It may be objected that the large employer might well be using
a different production process, such as newer and better ma-
chines, and that this may contribute to the safer working environ-
ment. While this may be true, it should be noted that providing
safe machines is simply one element among the broad range of
activities which the author has been referring to as "safety regu-
lation."
Of course, the converse may also be true; a new machine or
production material employed by a large firm, while increasing
productivity, may well be more dangerous to the health or safety
of the employee. Lack of experience in operation of the new
machine or process makes this effect likely. Therefore, low injury
rates would indicate that considerable expense and research have
been contributed to insuring a safer working environment.
One conclusion seems inescapable; large firms have been able
to economically decrease frequency rates through safety regu-
lation. The Alcoa experience was not anomolous. However, an-
other conclusion seems equally inescapable; the same job is not
being done in smaller plants, by management, government, or
anyone else, although small plants presumably could be as safe as
large ones.
IV. The Efficacy of Present Regulatory Activities
A. General Observations
Two observations about the current level of injury frequency
have been noted. (1) While the rates tended to decline in the
1950's, they have held steady or increased slightly in the 1960's.
(2) There are currently large industrial groups in which the injury
rates are far higher than our ultimate goals indicate would be
desirable. This latter observation was the basis for the author's
conclusion that more needs to be done to insure safe working
conditions. It was then demonstrated that industrial safety was
not inherently unamenable to regulation, and that more can, in
fact, be done.
Yet one should not condemn the present system of regulation
at all levels (private, state and federal) merely because much more
progress is necessary. Another measure of the effectiveness of the
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present system is the extent to which it has caused injury rates to
decline. The present system may well be satisfactory if industry is
approaching acceptable rates at a reasonable speed.
Assessments of the system on this latter basis vary according
to which base year one chooses for measuring improvement. It
would seem highly illogical to cite improvement from 1916, or
even 1950, as an example of the system's effectiveness, since it
has not been able to reduce rates during the 1960's at all. 43
Acceptable injury rates simply are not yet being attained. Secre-
tary Wirtz, noting the steady increase in frequency rates since
1958, stated that "[t]ime is working today not as the ally, but as
the enemy, of occupational safety."
44
The purpose of this section will be to determine which of the
current methods and levels of regulation-state, federal, or pri-
vate-have had the greatest impact upon injury rates.
B. The Efficacy of Voluntary Safety Programs
Safety standards for voluntary programs are primarily devel-
oped in two ways. (1) "Consensus" standards are approved by
two nationally recognized standards organizations-the United
States of America Standards Institute (U.S.A.S.I.), and the Na-
tional Fire Protection Association 45 - through predominant volun-
tary acceptance by interest groups. (2) "Proprietary" standards
are approved by various professional organizations and adopted
primarily by individual plants. 46 These standards are often
adopted by government regulatory agencies. There seems to be
little difference between the standards and techniques operating
voluntarily and those operating by law, where government regu-
lation exists.
It is generally agreed that when private industry has seen fit to
act to insure safe working conditions, it has been very successful.
This conclusion is largely based upon a comparison of the injury
43 HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, Minority views on H.R. 17748, H.R. No.
1720 supra at 44; the minority used 1947 as the base year to measure improvement
and concluded that "(c)ertainly the evidence that we have shows that excellent
progress is being made in the field of industrial health and safety ......
44 Wirtz, supra note 9 at 70.
45 STATUS OF SAFETY STANDARDS, supra note 37 at 1-9 and 103.
46 Id. at 104.
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frequency rates of members of the National Safety Council
(NSC) to those of non-members.
Diagram 2
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The achievements of NSC members have been used to buttress
the assumption that something significant can be done in this
area.48 The possibility that NSC members belong to inherently
safer industries is rebutted by specific industry comparisons be-
tween NSC members and non-members. In 1965, for example,
the rates were 10.5 (NSC), 25.6 (Bureau of Labor Stan-
dards-BLS) in foundries; 4.2 (NSC), 12.5 (BLS) in Machinery;
4.5 (NSC), 19.7 (BLS) in sheet metal products, and 15.9 (NSC),
41.0 (BLS) in the lumber industry.49
NSC members do have an excellent record. It is not clear,
however, that this record is attributable to NSC membership. The
members of NSC are 5,000 of the nation's largest firms, 50 and as
has already been demonstrated, large firms generally have better
safety records. Table 2 in Appendix A indicates that for two of
the industries listed above, lumber and machinery, the difference
between large and small firm rates in Virginia corresponds closely
47 See Table 4, App. A, for precise data.
48 Wirtz, supra note 9 at 64 and 71.
49 Id.
50 TIME, Feb. 7, 1969, supra note 8 at 77.
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to the differences in rates based upon the NSC-BLS distinction.
Both tables 2 and 3 indicate that the rates of large reporting units
are roughly comparable to the NSC rates.
Thus NSC membership itself does not appear to be particularly
significant. Even if it were significant, only 0.1 per cent of all U.S.
manufacturers participate in its programs. 51 Thus, the impact
upon American industrial safety of NSC programs would not be
great. Nonetheless, private initiative, for whatever reasons, has
been singularly effective in this small number of cases in reducing
frequency rates to more than acceptable levels.
C. The Influence of State Workmen's Compensation Laws
One widely-held view is that state workmen's compensation
laws have a natural tendency to reduce injury frequency rates as
employers are stimulated by the potential cost of these programs
to insure safe working conditions. This theory is espoused by
those opposed to increased safety legislation, and has been suc-
cinctly described by Thomas D. Nyhan:
The genius of [the workmen's compensation]
system is that it gives employers a built-in
financial incentive to reduce injuries. Under
the rating system, there is a direct relation-
ship between the employer's safety perform-
ance and the price he pays for his com-
pensation insurance. This built-in financial in-
centive has made the prevention of accidents
an integral part of the competitive business
enterprise system.5 2
The prevalence and intuitive acceptability of this theory necessi-
tates a careful and extensive evaluation of the impact of work-
men's compensation on injury frequency, with an eye toward the
possibility of further reductions in frequency rates through in-
creased workmen's compensation benefits.
It is evident that under this system an employer would benefit
financially by operating at an injury level at which his workmen's
compensation expenses are low. However, it must be remem-
bered, in light of the economist's marginal-cost analysis, that a
51 Id. at 77.
52 Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 9 at 713, statement of Thomas D. Nyhan.
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point is reached at which the additional dollar spent on safety
measures will be less than compensated for by the decrease in
workmen's compensation costs. Therefore Mr. Nyhan's theory,
from the point of view of pure incentive based upon profit motiva-
tion, does not hold true over the entire range of injury frequency
rates. A point will always be reached at which it is no longer
profitable to increase attempts to reduce injury rates.
Keeping this fact in mind, the author will analyze the degree of
incentive to reduce frequency rates which workmen's com-
pensation has provided, and will analyze the actual impact of
workmen's compensation on frequency rates. It will then be pos-
sible to determine whether an increase in compensation rates
would be an effective approach to further promotion of industrial
safety.
1. Workmen's Compensation As An Incentive
To Reduce Injury Frequency Rates
Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have com-
pulsory workmen's compensation for most of the workers cov-
ered, while twenty-three states have elective systems. 53 In the
elective states, if an employer rejects the system, he loses, in
actions brought by injured workmen, the common-law defenses of
assumption of risk, the fellow-servant doctrine, and contributory
negligence. Under elective systems, it is more advantageous for
an employer to elect workmen's compensation since the injured
worker may well collect much less under the system than his lost
income alone. For example, in Indiana, a permanently and totally
disabled worker with a present salary of $5,600 and an expected
working life of thirty more years would obtain a maximum of
$2,340 annually, only 41.4% of his present salary, and only
17.1% of his expected salary in the thirtieth year.5 4 In Alabama, a
worker would receive even less ($1,976 annually) and payments
would terminate after five years. This may partially explain why
employers of 74% of the non-agricultural work force in Indiana,
5
3
Id. at 277-314. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR. SUMMARY OF
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, LABOR LAW SERIES No. 10, January
1967, at 2.
'4 Smedley, The Failure of Workmen's Compensation Laws, AFL-CIO AMERICAN FED-
ERATIONIST, March 1966, at 15.
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and 69% in Alabama, elected workmen's compensation in 1964. 55
Among nearly all the states utilizing either compulsory or elective
systems, the ratio of maximum temporary total disability benefits
to average weekly wages has declined steadily since 1940, often
by about fifty per cent. In 1966 this ratio for a married worker
with two dependent children was over one hundred per cent in
only two states.56 The remaining states ranged from ten to six-
ty-nine per cent with a median around forty-five per cent.
These facts indicate that workmen's compensation is sig-
nificantly undercompensating the worker relative to his wage loss,
and that this undercompensation is generally increasing. Regard-
less of whether the incentive to decrease injury rates provided by
the workmen's compensation system is also declining, it does not
appear that the absolute level of incentive is nearly as great as
would exist when an employer elects to remain out of the system,
and has greater liability in case of accident or death.
57
2. Actual Impact of Workmen's Compensation
Upon Injury Frequency Rates
If the apparently small incentive to provide safe working condi-
tions motivated by the presently inadequate workmen's com-
pensation system has had a significant impact upon injury rates,
then perhaps an increase in workmen's compensation coverage
and benefits would effect a decline in these rates. The author has
used several analytical techniques in order to determine whether
there has been much of an impact.
One approach was to determine whether states with lower
injury frequency rates had stronger workmen's compensation sys-
tems. If this were generally true, then it would be possible to
55 BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
BULLETIN 279, 1966, at 71.
56 The two states are Arizona and Hawaii. Javits, Senator J., 26 CONG. REC. E430 1, May
16, 1968; from a table prepared by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
57 One may wonder why any employer would fail to adopt the system. First, there may be
industries or industrial units in which injuries are so infrequent and inexpensive that
the administrative costs of workmen's compensation would exceed them. Second,
small firms with less than from three to fifteen employees are exempt from coverage
in twenty-seven states. AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, supra note 54. This
would account for a large number of workers in some of the elective states. It
appears, however, that nearly all employers elect the system when there is a choice.
The percentage of workers covered is on the average about the same for elective and
compulsory states. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 55.
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hypothesize that workmen's compensation has a greater impact
upon rates than any other factor. If not, such a hypothesis is
clearly impossible.
One indication of the strength of a state's workmen's com-
pensation system might be the percentage of the non-agricultural
work force covered. Table 5 in Appendix A compares this per-
centage with the available injury frequency rates of various states.
The comparison reveals no significant relationship between these
two factors.
58
Table 11 in Appendix A presents comparisons of various other
possible measures of workmen's compensation effectiveness with
frequency rates for four states having clearly different safety
records. While some of the factors show a certain relationship to
frequency rates, it is not possible to explain the differences in
rates on the basis of the strength of the workmen's compensation
systems.
Another method of measuring the possible effect of workmen's
compensation is to determine whether any reduction in rates has
resulted from the advent or increase of compensation in specific
states. Pennsylvania is the only state which has made information
available upon which such a study could be based. The Pennsyl-
vania authorities tend to favor the interpretation that com-
pensation has had a significant effect upon rates, looking at
long-range trends:
During the fifty-two year history of the Penn-
sylvania Workmen's Compensation Law the
compensation awarded 3,097,652 work in-
juries and occupational disease cases amount-
ed to $1,033,487,985.
The most significant trend during these
years has been a decrease in number of work
injuries accompanied by a rise in com-
pensation. '[he drop in number of com-
pensated job mishaps reflects declines in
number of fatalities and temporary disabilities
which in 1967 were less than in 1916 by 76.7
58 This may be explained in part by the fact that no account is taken of the difference in the
type of industries in each state. Some states may have, on the average, less dangerous
industries. For example, Wyoming's high frequency rate is largely due to a 115.0 rate
in lumber for 1967. Also, there is a possibility that frequency rates are more under-
stated in some states than in others. But the lack of any significant relationship at all




per cent and 36.5 per cent, respectively. With
more compensation appropriated by law
through the years, average benefits increased
between 1916 and 1967 from $2,383 to
$19,266 per fatal case and from $38 to $397
per temporary injury award. Permanent dis-
abilities averaged $1,185 in 1916 and $2,177
in 1967.
59
While this statement implies that increased compensation has
effected a decrease in injury rates, too many other factors might
explain changes in rates over the last fifty-two years. A definite
causal relationship cannot be accurately determined from this
type of time-series comparison.
As table 6 in Appendix A indicates, recent experience in
Pennsylvania suggests that other factors are of more significant
influence. Pennsylvania frequency rates have maintained a fairly
constant increase since 1961. Over the same period, recovery per
accident has also risen. There is no indication that compensation
was stated in constant dollars, so it must be assumed that the
amounts are stated in actual dollars. This means that com-
pensation in constant dollars has remained about the same
throughout the 1960's, assuming about a two per cent annual
increase in the cost of living over this period. There is, therefore,
no real change in compensation upon which a conclusion of lack
of impact upon injury rates can be based. The same is true in the
case of occupational disease. However, the number of disease
cases has halved between 1965 and 1967, while the actual dollar
value per case was declining. Furthermore, there was a marked
increase in the number of cases from 1956 to 1960, during which
period the compensation per case was also increasing. These facts
indicate that the variation in cost of an instance of occupational
disease does not appear to have resulted in a corresponding
variation in effective efforts to reduce the incidence of occupa-
tional disease.
In short, the little evidence which is available on the effect of
workmen's compensation is spotty and inconclusive. It does not
indicate in any way a significant impact upon frequency rates.
59 PA. DEPT. OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, SUMMARY: COMPENSABLE WORK INJURIES IN
PENNSYLVANIA, 1967, at 2.
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3. Cost-Analysis of the Impact of an Increase
in Workmen's Compensation
Theoretically, one should not expect an increase in workmen's
compensation rates to significantly lower the frequency rates.
While a significant increase in the rates of compensation
may considerably benefit the individual injured workers, the in-
centive to reduce frequency rates produced by increased com-
pensation rates would not be significant from a cost analysis
standpoint.
Diagram 3 demonstrates that since an individual employer is
interested in minimizing the total cost of injuries, he must take
into account the cost of safety programs. While the costs suffered
as a result of injuries -workmen's compensation, replacement
and training of personnel, lost production, and so forth-are likely
to increase in a linear fashion as the frequency rate increases, the
cost of injury prevention is nonetheless subject to diminishing
returns. As more money is spent, the injury rate is likely to
decline. However, as the frequency rate approaches zero, addi-
tional expenditures will have less effect per dollar upon that rate
than those dollars spent on safety when the rate was higher. The
total cost, at any frequency rate, will be the sum of all of these
costs. Assuming that an employer minimizes these costs if he can,
a doubling of workmen's compensation benefits will not induce a
halving of the frequency rate. Rather, the induced decrease in the
frequency rate will be considerably less than that.
Diagram 3 also demonstrates that in order to decrease the
injury frequency rate to OB from OA, in the event of an increase
in workmen's compensation benefits, the employer must increase
his total cost from Oa to OB to continue his minimization of
costs. As a practical matter, the minimum total costs get very
high if increased benefits to reduce injury rates much below OB
are relied upon. Alternatively, if it is decided to enforce standards
against this hypothetical employer, which would cause him to
increase his safety spending, while leaving workmen's com-
pensation rates at the initial level so that his total costs were Ob,
the injury rate would be reduced to OC by the shift from point I




A Cost Analysis of the Effect Upon Injury Frequency Rates




t2) Workmen's Compensation costs (rate # 1)
t3t W.C. and other accident costs (at rate # 1)
(4) W.C. and other accident costs (at rate # 2-
double the benefits per injury)
(5) Total cost under rate # 1;(1) + (3)
(6) Total cost under rate # 2; (1) + (4)





Oa = minimum total cost under rate #1
Ob = minimum total cost under rate #2
OA - equilibrium frequency rate under rate #1
O8 = equilibrium frequency rate under rate #2
OC =frequency rate at total cost (b), if instead of raising workmen's compens
we force the employer, through regulation, to increase safety expenditures
total cost equals (b)




rates, assuming that the employer minimizes his costs at Ob, the
injury rate has been reduced only to OB. By increasing com-
pensation, in order to lower the rates to OC, the employer is
required to minimize his costs at OC, a much higher cost to him.
In short, when increasing compensation rates to reduce frequency
rates are relied upon, in order to lower frequency rates the em-
ployer must spend increasingly more on safety and accident pre-
vention. He will be reluctant to spend the additional amounts
required unless compensation rates are so high that it would cost
him more not to do so. On the other hand, if only the safety
spending which would reduce the rates to the desired level were
required, the employer would be forced off his minimum cost
curve, but would be left with smaller compensation costs. Thus
the same result is achieved at lower cost tQ the employer.
In many cases, it would be desirable to lower injury rates by at
least one-half, and in some cases, by much more, in order to
achieve our goal. In most cases, it may also be desirable from the
viewpoint of the injured workers themselves to double the com-
pensation rates most workers are currently enjoying. It is doubt-
ful, however, whether compensation rates should be raised above
the amount of lost wages. Therefore, even if the additional ex-
pense to the employer were considered unimportant, the reduc-
tion of frequency rates to the desired level through increased
compensation could only be accomplished if the workers received
significant windfalls in compensation.
It would therefore appear that an increase in workmen's com-
pensation would not be the appropriate course of action to take in
pursuance of our injury rate goals. Both data and theory indicate
that compensation rates have little impact on injury rates, and
cost analysis theory further indicates that enforcement of safety
standards would be more economical than an increase in com-
pensation rates in achieving any given reduction in injury fre-
quency rates.
D. The Efficacy of State Safety Regulation
There appears to be no evidence of an appreciable influence of
present workmen's compensation laws upon injury frequency
rates. It would be better to proceed toward injury rate goals
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through safety regulation rather than by increasing compensation
benefits. However, it remains to be seen how effective state
efforts at safety regulation have been. One immediate answer is
that since rates have not been decreasing, state regulation has not
been effective. Safety can be regulated, and one could perhaps
conclude that if the states don't do the job, it remains for
the Federal Government to step into their shoes. However, the
potential effectiveness of state regulation bears on a determina-
tion of the Federal Government's proper role.
The author has found nothing to rebut the following statement:
I think it is demonstrable that state laws are
very weak as drafted. The safety standards
are most often written by the people that are
supposed to observe them; namely, industry.
There is an average of forty cents per worker
per year spent for industrial safety and health
by the States.
60
If state laws are generally weak, it would seem difficult to estab-
lish differences between them with respect to the efficacy of their
programs. Blackman, in noting that data from New York, Florida,
California, Wisconsin, and Illinois show increases in the fre-
quency rates (in the case of Florida, fluctuations) from 1960 to
1966, states:
Since all the above mentioned states have
ongoing programs, substantial safety regu-
lations, and fairly adequate staffs to enforce
the regulations, as well as offering consultant
type services to employers, it is reasonable to
conclude that the existence of regulations is
not a great factor in changing injury fre-
quency. 61
Blackman feels that because falls, manual handling of objects, and
vehicles, all significant agencies of accidents, do not seem to be
susceptible to regulation, it may be difficult to further reduce
injury rates. He forgets, however, that large firms, even in dan-
gerous industries, have been able to reduce rates. It seems more
likely that although these states have "ongoing programs" and
"substantial safety regulations," they have simply not done
enough to regulate safety.
60 Nader, Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 15 at 511.
61 Blackman, Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 27 at 218-219.
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Three aspects of state activity must be analyzed: (1) the degree
of enforcement activity and enthusiasm, (2) the quality of the
provisions for enforcement (each aspect must be viewed with
respect to the overall quality among the states, the degree to
which interstate differences are reflected in injury rate data, and
the value of the comparisons in determining the quality of state
activity), and (3) the quality of the codes and regulations.
62
One potential measure of the effect of state regulation is
comparison of the states with respect to evidence of enforcement
zeal. Table 7 in Appendix A compares state safety budgets, on
the average, for all states grouped according to their death rates.
This table was presented by the Secretary of Labor as significant
evidence that higher levels of state expenditure on safety do have
a marked impact upon death rates, and therefore have a marked
impact upon the safety of working conditions.
This is very convincing until one realizes that this chart may be
specially constructed to (a) take account of the death rate and
ignore the other types of disabling injuries, (b) average, rather
than classify, the budgets, so that any range of differences be-
tween states would not be apparent, and (c) pick the cutoff points
in state groupings so that the budget data would reflect the great-
est differences in averages. Whatever inverse relationship does
exist between the variables in table 7, it has surely been max-
imized.
If one examines recent overall frequency rates in manufac-
turing for a variety of states, and compares them with safety
expenditures per non-agricultural worker in these states, no such
relationship exists. This is clearly demonstrated by Table 8. Oth-
er factors, such as a state's industrial mix and unit sizes, are more
important in determining the level of injury frequency. For ex-
ample, as has been noted, in Wyoming, the lumber in-
dustry has a very high frequency rate which raises the overall
average for that state. In non-manufacturing industries, Wyom-
ing's average rate was in fact quite respectable in 1967.63 New
York, New Jersey, Virginia and Indiana have practically identical
62 A comparison of frequency rates for all manufacturing as between the states is not very
valuable, as rioted earlier, because some states may have a higher concentration of
more dangerous industries than others. Therefore, it will be beneficial to examine the
injury rates of states in terms of standard industrial classifications and compare them
on that basis.
63 WYOMING DEPT. OF LABOR, WYOMING INJURY REPORT, 1967.
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injury frequency rates, and yet they range from fifth to forty-third
in safety spending. Thus the size of the safety budget has no
identifiable influence.
Tables 9 through 11 in Appendix A examine the general safety
regulation picture (except for the comprehensiveness of safety
standards) by (a) comparing the frequency rates of a number of
states for specific industries, (b) ranking the states according to
their injury rate levels in a few of these specific industries, and (c)
comparing the safety programs of the worst states with those of
the best. No apparent relationship exists between the various
regulatory factors, or the general level of regulation and the corre-
sponding frequency rate.
The comprehensiveness of state codes and standards should
also be compared with frequency rates. Even with considerable
expenditure and stringent enforcement provisions, the impact on
frequency rates may be insignificant if weak or practically mean-
ingless regulations are being applied. It is difficult to analyze this
aspect of the problem. The various code provisions apply to a
variety of industries, and then only to select aspects of each
industry. Only infrequently does a code canvass an industry in
one neat package. Therefore, it is almost impossible to make any
judgments based upon individual codes and industries.
The U.S. Department of Labor has published Code Com-
parison Charts, however, which describe to some extent the
quality of codes with respect to certain subjects of regulation,
such as portable ladders, power presses, abrasive wheels and so
forth, by comparing them to the comprehensiveness or strictness
of the U.S.A.S.I. standards. These charts do not deal with en-
forcement provisions or activities such as those presented in
table 11. Nor do they attempt to establish the importance of any
particular provisions. Furthermore, no indication of the absolute
level of standard adequacy is presented. The 125 U.S.A.S.I.
standards which have thus far been published are considered
minimum by the Institute. Therefore, the standards themselves
may not be indicative of a level of regulation high enough to
explain differences in frequency rates between states which have
them, and those which do not. 64 Furthermore, the twenty Code
64 As noted earlier, U.S.A.S.I. standards are merely concensus standards adopted volun-




Comparison Charts which the Department of Labor supplied to
the author, dated 1960-1963, show that only a handful of states
had adopted even more than an insignificant percentage of these
minimum standards. The conclusion, as of 19.63, was clearly that
state codes and standards were totally inadequate. More recent
comparisons are not available, and therefore it is impossible to
tell whether there has been any significant improvement over the
last three or four years.
6 5
Unfortunately, even the published Code Comparison Charts
are not sufficiently comprehensive to give a completely valid
indication of the quality of a state's code system. There is some
indication that the examined codes are directed only toward a
relatively small group of the agencies involved in industrial acci-
dents.
Because of the dubious value of any of the comparisons be-
tween the states with respect to code comprehensiveness and
injury frequency rates, none of these comparisons are presented
here. 66
In summary, there is little evidence that current differences
among the states in frequency rates can be explained by
differences in their codes, enforcement provisions or enthusiasm.
The general level of these factors in all states is so inadequate
that the normal economic influences largely control the frequency
rate level.
As has been noted, some important authorities, such as Black-
man, have concluded that the poor results of state regulation
indicate an inherent inability to further lower injury frequency
rates. Roy G. Benson, manager of N.S.C.'s industrial safety de-
partment, has stated that "[t]his is a management rather than a
6 See WAGE AND LABOR STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, DI-
RECTORY AND INDEX OF SAFETY AND HEALTH LAWS AND CODES This publication,
undated, was only recently published and was received by the author September 3,
1969. While it is the most comprehensive list of state safety codes and regulations
available, it does nothing more than index them. It does not compare them to
U.S.A.S.I. standards.
6 It is interesting to note, however, that to some extent those states with lower frequency
rates in the early 1960's did appear to have superior codes. Pennsylvania had the best
set of codes relative to U.S.A.S.I. standards in the construction industry, and has
significantly lower frequency rates in construction than other states with available
construction industry frequency rates for this period. However, Florida, which has
high rates in general despite relative superiority in most other aspects of safety
regulation, also has the highest frequency rates in construction despite a relatively
comprehensive set of construction codes.
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regulatory problem. The biggest difficulty is in worker educa-
tion." 67 His bias toward private initiative is, however, apparent.
Management has conflicting interests; the safety interest is some-
what at odds with the profit maximization motive. Furthermore, it
is clear that safety education can be made a part of any regulatory
scheme, as is currently the case in some states.
Adequate safety can be provided with appropriate regulation.
However, no proof of that fact is to be gleaned from the perform-
ance of any particular state. Unfortunately, available information
does not indicate which aspects of a government regulatory
scheme might be the most important and influential. What the
data do indicate is that all of the states have inadequate regu-
latory schemes in all of their important aspects. No significant
differences between state performances are to be found; no states
have stepped forward with particularly exemplary records, and
the injury rates everywhere continue to rise.
E. The Federal Safety Record
There is at least some basis for a comparison of the Federal
Government's effort with that of the states. The problem of safety
regulation is, of course, the same for both the Federal Govern-
ment and the states. But where the Federal Government has been
more successful, there are indications that a difference in ap-
proach or in enthusiasm of regulation is the reason for that suc-
cess. This section will, therefore, attempt to evaluate the success
of federal projects, where the evidence has rendered such a deter-
mination possible.
When the Federal Government has been active in safety regu-
lation, it seems to have achieved positive results. In large federal
agencies covered by U.S. Mission Safety-70, the injury rates in
six of the eight agencies covered by the program have decreased
since 1960, and rates have decreased in five of the agencies since
1956.68 The most dramatic results have been obtained among
workers covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 1958:
In shipyards, the injury frequency rate per
million man-hours worked in 1960 was
67 TIME, Feb. 7, 1969, supra note 8 at 77.
68 SAFETY ENGINEERING AND PROGRAM SERVICES, supra note 21 at 15.
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thirty-eight disabling injuries. In longshoring,
it was 132. Compare these figures with the
annual rate as indicated by the first nine
months of 1967, and the thirty-eight rate has
dropped to 21.7. The 132 rate has dropped to
82.69
It is not possible to determine precisely the extent of improve-
ment in the records of industrial units working under federal con-
tract and subject to the Walsh-Healey Act. Walsh-Healey rates
are not reported. And of course firms that have federal contracts
do a considerable amount of work which is not covered by the
Act. There is, however, sufficient evidence indicating that the
Federal Government is more conscientious in its enforcement of
Walsh-Healey provisions 70 than are the states. 7
1
One explanation of the Federal Government's ability to reduce
rates while the states have not done so may be the more stringent
enforcement procedures of the federal acts. State laws impose
fines for failure to correct a violation, 72 while the penalties pro-
vided under federal law are generally broader in scope. Under
section 41(t) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, for example, a fine is assessable against any em-
ployer who "knowingly" violates the safety provisions. 73 Further-
more, the fine provided by this section is $100-$3,000, much
greater than any provided by state laws. 74 The Walsh-Healey Act
provides that any safety violation will result in a company being
listed by the Comptroller General as ineligible for federal con-
tracts for three years. 75 Under the McNamara-O'Hara Act, the
Federal Government has the right to void contracts when safety
69 Wirtz, Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 9; See also, "Safety Engineering and Program
Services," supra note 21 at 7.
70 In fiscal 1963, federal authorities inspected 2,136 establishments, while state authorities
inspected 2,384 establishments. Only 846 of these establishments were found in
violation of the Act by the state inspectors, while the federal inspectors found 1,830
violations. Report by Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division, U.S. Dept. of
Labor. Findings in regular and special safety and health inspections made under the
Public Contracts Act, fiscal year 1963; reprinted as appendix to remarks of George
H.R. Taylor, supra note 36.
71 States help to enforce the Walsh-Healy provisions by virtue of the fact that compliance
with state health and safety provisions is prima facie evidence of compliance with the
Act. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
72 Wirtz, Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 9 at 74.
73 33 U.S.C. 941, 1958.
74 See Table 11, App. A.
75 Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 37, 1936.
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violations occur in their performance. 76 These types of penalties
are more severe than anything the states now have, and they
emphasize the violation itself, rather than simply a failure to
correct.
It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions concerning the
inherent differences between the ability of the states and of the
Federal Government to handle safety regulation. Nonetheless,
the Federal Government has been able to effect a significant
impact on frequency rates, apparently because there are stronger
laws behind federal programs, and because of a more enthusiastic
enforcement of these laws.
F. Conclusions on the Status of Regulatory Activities
The available evidence indicates that state regulation has not
had any significant impact upon injury frequency rates. Neither
workmen's compensation nor safety codes under state statutes
have had any appreciable effect. In the case of workmen's com-
pensation, it does not appear that significant increases in benefits
on the state level would appreciably reduce frequency rates.
77
There is every reason to expect, however, that a significant
increase in safety regulation would effect a decline in frequency
rates. The Federal Government, although its present role is limit-
ed, has achieved better results than the states, and shown by its
performance that government regulational can have an impact
upon rates. The reason for the superior federal performance ap-
pears to lie, as previously noted, in the stronger enforcement
provisions of the federal statutes, and the greater enthusiasm of
the Department of Labor in enforcing the provisions of these
statutes.
Arguments have been presented by some people to the effect
that little can be done by anyone, except perhaps by management
itself, to further reduce injury frequency rates. These arguments
are generally based upon observation of increasing rates in the
face of state activity. However, state activity, even at its best,
appears stagnant. The results of the safety programs of large firms
has indicated that rates can indeed be further reduced. There is,
however, no reason to believe that only private initiative can do
76 Section 4(b), McNamara-O'Hara Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351, 1965.
77 A federal workmen's compensation act, which would accomplish the same result,
would be inefficacious for the same reasons.
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the job; the Federal Government's record belies this contention.
There is no real difference between the techniques which the
government authorities would employ in an intensive safety cam-
paign and those currently in use by energetic establishments. It is
merely a question of realizing a higher level of concern and
initiative at the public level where, on the private level, this
concern and initiative have stagnated.
It seems clear that this higher level of government involvement
must be undertaken by the Federal Government. Thus far, in its
limited involvement in safety regulation, the Federal Government
has shown an ability to achieve results. The states, on the other
hand, have nqt. The only logical explanation is that state legisla-
tures and agencies have not been sufficiently committed to that
end.
To suggest that these problems should be left to the states,
since they could be effective if they wanted to, is to suggest that
nothing at all be done. Safety regulation is a problem of national
scope. To suggest that such a problem be left to the vagaries and
inclinations of state government is to suggest that safety should
not be considered a national problem. But the problem
exists; it is real and begs solution. This should be reason enough
for Congressional action. The preceding analysis has merely in-
dicated a few of the means of control which might be necessary
and effective in a comprehensive safety program. Any federal
program could easily incorporate any of these elements.
There are additional reasons for insisting that the best course
of action is to proceed on the federal level. Enforcement is impos-
sible without effective standards. As has been noted, the only
important private standards exist on a national level. The contin-
ued promotion of national safety standards seems the only fea-
sible means of providing a comprehensive set of standards which
could be applied in industry nationwide.
Likewise, diverse and decentralized state enforcement agencies
and procedures are not likely to be as effective as a single agency
deriving its authority and safety consciousness from a single na-
tional mandate. Local prejudices and loyalties would fail to have a
political impact on enforcement undertaken at the national level.
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V. A Proposal For Federal Action
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968,78 proposed
by Senator Yarborough 79 and Representative O'Hara, along with
fifteen other Congressmen80 seems to have been the best solution
suggested to date in light of the policy goals presented in this
article. It was rejected possibly because the cost of the program
was not adequately determined, and, more fundamentally, be-
cause Congress was not convinced that the problem needed addi-
tional government control, or that the federal action was appro-
priate.81 Other political considerations must have entered in as
well, including the problem of scaling priorities for federal spend-
ing. Consideration of these political questions is beyond the scope
of this article. Our analysis here is limited to a discussion of the
best approach to an assumed policy goal of reducing injury fre-
quency.
The 1968 bills provided for the establishment of safety and
health standards applicable to any businesses affecting commerce.
The Secretary of Labor, acting unilaterally or, in some cases,
acting in conjunction with the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, would have considerable discretion in setting standards
and in employing the services of private, state, and federal
agencies in developing these standards. Moreover, the Secretary
of Labor could delegate his authority to appropriate state
agencies when considered feasible. Federal inspection of any
employer unit covered by the act would be authorized upon
presentation of credentials. Criminal penalties would be provided
for interference with these inspection functions.
The Secretary would be empowered to issue cease and desist
orders, on his own initiative, to prohibit the continuation of the
violation or employment on unsafe premises. These orders would
be enforceable in Federal District Courts. The Secretary could
also obtain injunctions to the same effect from Federal District
Courts. Review of the Secretary's orders in District Courts would
78 See App. B for the text of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968. The text
includes the author's proposed amendments.
79 S.2864, introduced.
80 
HR. 14816, January 24, 1968.
81 See generally H.R. Report no. 1720, Minority views, supra note 43, at 34-if.
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be limited to a determination of whether working conditions
posed a threat of imminent harm to employees. Thus, the
judiciary would provide at least a limited check upon the Secre-
tary's regulatory powers. State courts would be prevented from
asserting jurisdiction over any occupational safety or health issue
unless the Secretary declined jurisdiction in a specific area.
82
The Labor and HEW Secretaries would be empowered to
create and supervise worker training programs involving recogni-
tion and avoidance of safety hazards. In light of the possibility of
severe federal penalties, private safety programs of a similar na-
ture would undoubtedly develop.
A civil penalty of a $1,000 fine for each safety offense was
stipulated. Each day of continuing failure to comply with the
provisions or rules or an order of the Secretary would be a
separate offense. Furthermore, a willful violation of the act would
be a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than
six months, or by a $5,000 fine, or both. After the first offense,
the penalties increase to imprisonment of one year and a fine of
$10,000. The Act would also apply to federal contracts, and,
while not modifying or repealing the Walsh-Healey or
McNamara-O'Hara Service-Contracts Act, it would supplement
them.
Finally, the Secretary of Labor would have discretion to au-
thorize grants to the states in furtherance of their own safety
programs. This would enable the Federal Government to in-
directly influence safety in areas to which its commerce power
does not extend.
These provisions may seem harsh in some circumstances, and
indeed they might be. The Secretary of Labor would be empo-
wered, however, to create reasonable exemptions from the oper-
ations of the statute. It is clear that such an act would be effective
only to the extent that it is forcefully administered. Its provisions
would have to be fairly stringent in order to have the desired
stimulus upon employers to increase safety. Without such a stim-
ulus, we have no reason to expect that the state of industrial
82 The Secretary might, in his discretion, decline to assert jurisdiction over any occupation-
al safety or health issue or class of issues governed by state law if he believed that the
provisions of such state law and their enforcement carried out the provisions of the
Act. See App. B.
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safety will improve. For these reasons, the author finds the provi-
sions of this bill eminently reasonable.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968, of course,
never emerged from the Congressional committees which consid-
ered it. Business opposition to a general federal industrial safety
law still runs high.8 Currently, Congress is considering legislation
proposed by President Nixon which is somewhat similar to the
Johnson proposal, and probably stands about an equal chance of
successful passage.84
The Nixon proposal would establish a new federal agency
which would "impose health and safety standards to protect
American workers if the states failed to do so themselves.-8 5 This
agency would be headed by a five-member Occupational Safety
and Health Board which would be empowered to set broad safety
requirements for most business establishments. The Board's
members would be appointed for five-year terms, and at least
three of the members of any Board would be required to possess
"technical competence."-
8 6
The role of Secretary of Labor is quite different under this
proposal than under the Occupational Safety and Health Act:
The Secretary of Labor would be given the
task of enforcing the standards. If he deter-
mined that a violation existed, he would peti-
tion the Board. The Board would then hold
formal hearings and issue an appropriate or-
der, which the Secretary of Labor could then
enforce in court. (Emphasis added)87
This reduced authority of the Secretary of Labor under this
proposal would seem to make enforcement of safety regulations
more tenuous and difficult than under the Johnson Administration
bill. Under the Nixon proposal, a finding of a violation by both
the Secretary and the Board would be required before enforce-
ment would be possible. Moreover, the Secretary would be limit-
ed to court enforcement of a Board order, and would lack the
power to unilaterally issue cease and desist orders. Thus, under
83 New York Times, August 7, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
84 Id. The Administration Bills are S-2788 and HR-13373, August 6, 1969. See CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REPORT, supra note 7 at 1468.
85 Id. at 1469.
86 1d.
87 50 CCH LABOR LAW REP. Aug. 12, 1969, at I.
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the Nixon proposal, it would be more difficult to establish a
violation in the first instance and subsequently to take measures
to counteract it. The enforcement provisions of the Johnson bill
therefore seem preferable.
The Nixon proposal further hampers enforcement by diluting
the criminal penalties for violation which the 1968 bill coritain-
ed. 88
Furthermore, the proposal is peculiarly structured so as to
place as much emphasis as possible on state regulation. Whenever
the Board is "satisfied" with the regulatory efforts of a specific
state, it will not intervene within that state.89 In light of the states'
inability to achieve reductions in frequency rates, even where
there are "satisfactory" programs, this emphasis on state regu-
lation should be avoided. The need to improve conditions in
particularly dangerous plants or industries which exist in even the
most exemplary states should not be overlooked. The encour-
agement of state development of safety standards is also undesi-
rable, since meaningful standards have been developed almost
exclusively on a national level. However, the most troublesome
aspect of the Nixon proposal, in light of its emphasis on state
action, is the probability that the federal agency would fail to
develop the zeal necessary to contribute substantially to industrial
safety. For these reasons, the Johnson Administration's bill
seems considerably preferable to the Nixon proposal.
The author would, however, propose the following additions to
the Johnson proposal. (1) Since appropriate measures by some
business establishments to comply with safety regulations might
involve prohibitive expense, in the public interest of maintaining
these establishments, occasional subsidies might be provided by
the Federal Government to aid compliance with the act.90 It
88 A maximum fine is $10,000, instead of $1,000 per day, and the misdemeanor privisions
are not included, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. supra note 7 at 1469.
8 New York Times, August 7, 1969, at 1. At least three states are presumed to have
"outstanding" safeiy programs: New York, Pennsylvania, and California. Presum-
ably, regulation in'at least these states would not be preempted. The bill further
provides that any state can get federal aid in order to develop its own safety program,
with 90% of the cost of standard development and 50% of enforcement costs supplied
by the Federal Government. The Johnson administration bill, on the other hand,
emphasizes Federal standards and would have the Secretary of Labor critically
analyze a particular state law before declining jurisdiction. See note 75 supra and
accompanying text.
90 For example, Arch J. Alexander, former chief of the West Virginia Department of
Mines, testified against proposed mining safety legislation before the House Educa-
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would be important under this proposal, however, not to subsi-
dize an employer's inefficiency. Subsidies should be based, rather,
on substantial diseconomies of scale.91
(2) Many problems arise after new machinery or processes are
introduced. A reasonable solution to this problem would be to
require the vendors of new machinery or marketable production
methods to include in their sales contracts warranties that their
product complies with federal safety requirements. This would
place the burden of non-compliance upon the vendor and would
necessitate safety consciousness on his part. In conjunction with
this proposal, regular inspection by federal inspectors should be
implemented in order to assure fairly rapid discovery of any
inadequacy inherent in new production techniques.
92
(3) It would seem reasonable to exempt employers from the
application of the act when they have achieved an injury fre-
quency level which is acceptable in terms of the safety goals of
the particular industry. 93 Thus, achievement would be adequately
rewarded. The Secretary would establish industry goals and the
employers that have achieved, through whatever means, the safe-
ty consciousness and safe conditions to meet these goals would
have thereby sufficiently met the public policy rationale under-
lying the act to justify being excluded from its provisions.
This proposal would be preferable to exempting states with
"satisfactory" programs, since (a) emphasis is not placed on state
activity, which may or may not adequately deal with a specific
hazardous situation, and (b) the Federal Government will be
directly concerned with each employer who has an unsatisfactory
tion and Labor Committee's General Subcommittee on Labor on April 16, 1969, on
the grounds that small mines couldn't afford to meet the health and safety require-
ments of the act. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., March 14, 1969, at 377.
91 See App. B, proposed section 11. Another proposal worthy of consideration is the
establishment of tax credits for compliance with burdensome safety requirements.
This proposal, of course, would benefit all employers, not merely those for whom
compliance with a particular safety requirement would be economically impossible.
92 See App. B, proposed section 3(c). It would seem that a process for federal approval of
new production methods, before their introduction into actual working situations,
might be a reasonable alternative to this proposal. This would not only stimulate
thinking about safety problems before they can arise in actual working situations, but
would also help to stimulate updating of safety standards to insure their currency.
This proposal might, however, serve to create unreasonable delay in the introduction
of new production processes or techniques.
93 See App. B, proposed sections 2(a) (8) and 3(a).
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safety record, even in states where the average frequency rate is
low.
(4) The 1968 bill proposed that businesses covered by the Act
report injury data to the Secretary of Labor. The bill should
explicate that reporting of injury rates would be required, and that
measurement of these rates would be subject to Federal standards
and control. 94 This requirement would facilitate the establishment
of national goals for specific industries, and enable the Secretary
of Labor to grant specific exemptions based upon these injury
rate goals.
(5) A private remedy in state court should be made available
for the benefit of individual employees aggrieved by a violation of
the Act.95 Recovery under this provision should be based upon
the degree of exposure to imminent danger. Such a provision
would have the advantage of fairly compensating an employee
who works under conditions which violate the Act even if his
employer is exempt from the application of the Act by virtue of
an overall frequency rate which falls below the industry goal set
by the Secretary of Labor under the third proposal, supra.
Such a program would not be inexpensive. In 1967, the states
spent $65,173,400 on safety, which averaged only 40c per work-
er.96 While the Federal Government could hope to stimulate state
spending and private initiative under the proposed safety pro-
gram, it would seem that considerably more than this amount
would be necessary. Whether or not such spending is desirable in
light of other important federal programs is not to be decided
here. But should it be decided that it is in the national interest to
establish reasonably safe working conditions for American work-
ers, an effort of no less magnitude can be seriously contemplated.
94 See App. B, proposed sections 6(b) and 3(a).
95 See App. B, proposed Section 7(d).
96 Hearings on S. 2864, supra note 9 at 894.
* VIRGINIA DEPT. OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS,
VIRGINIA WORK INJURIES, 1967. Industries have been reordered by the author
according to the frequency rates for all reporting units. See also BUREAU OF ENGI-
NEERING AND SAFETY, N.J. DEPT. OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY WORK INJURIES IN






WORKER FREQUENCY RATES, ON AND OFF THE JOB, 1967*
Death' Injury
2  Frequency 3
Deaths Injuries Rate Rate Rate
All accidents ............... 54,000 5,200,000 .12 11.9 12.0
(Workers)
At work .................. 14,200 2,200,000 .10 14.7 14.8
Away from work ........ 39,800 3,000,000 .14 10.5 10.6
Motor vehicle ......... 24,600 9,000,000 .90 33.0 33.9
Public non-
motor-vehicle ......... 7,700 1,000,000 .07 9.7 9.8
Home .................. 7,500 1,100,000 .05 7.0 7.1
* NAT. SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1968, p. 25.
'deaths per million man-hours
2 disabling injuries (excepting deaths) per million man-hours
3 sum of(1) and (2)
Table 2
INJURY FREQUENCY RATES FOR SELECTED MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES BY SIZE OF REPORTING UNIT
IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 1967*
According to number of employees
All Reporting Average I.F. rates for units with:
less than
Industry Units 50 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 or more
All manufacturing .......... 13.2 24.2 22.3 23.0 12.4 6.4
Chemical Prod ............. 2.5 19.6 4.9 8.5 6.9 1.2
Profess., contr., and
Scientif. Inst ............... 4.0 6.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Elec. Equip ................ 4.6 11.3 15.7 18.6 8.6 1.8
Textile Mill Prod .......... 6.6 11.7 12.4 8.9 12.7 4.5
Apparel and Rel. Prod. 7.4 2.8 6.8 6.0 8.4 6.9
Paper and Allied Prod. 8.3 14.5 19.6 11.1 9.2 5.4
Tobacco Manuf ........... 8.6 6.6 n.a. 19.0 11.6 6.2
Miscel. Manuf ............. 9.9 8.0 11.2 21.4 n.a. n.a.
Printing, Pub., etc ......... 10.0 11.3 6.3 9.8 9.7 -
Transport. Equip .......... 12.9 33.3 35.2 35.9 30.3 10.6
Machinery .................. 13.4 20.9 21.0 23.7 10.7 -
Leather Prod .............. 13.5 0.0 n.a. 39.8 3.4 -
Furniture and Fixtures .... 15.5 15.6 21.6 31.2 18.0 11.7
Primary Metals ............. 16.2 48.2 41.3 63.0 n.a. 5.1
Rubber and Plastics ....... 16.4 16.4 n.a. 16.4 n.a. 14.1
Food and Kindred Prod.. 25.0 23.9 24.2 29.8 23.2 24.8
Stone, Clay and Glass ..... 25.6 27.7 30.9 38.0 5.8 -
Fabric, Metal Prod ........ 27.4 35.0 47.0 38.5 17.2 -
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INJURY RATES IN MANUFACTURING-
NSC MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS*












* NAT'L. SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1968, p. 27; non-member figures are the
total U.S. experience projected from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS)
rates, less experience of reporters to Nat'l. Safety Council.
Table 5
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COVERAGE AND INJURY
FREQUENCY RATES, AVAILABLE STATES


































* From WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, SUPRA note 55.
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TABLE 7
WORK DEATHS FALL AS SAFETY EXPENDITURES RISE*
States Safety States (grouped by Work Deaths
Budgets (Ave.) death rates) (A ve.)
$ 240,000 12 states (91-3 10) 110/thousand workers
270,000 12 states (55-80) 65/thousand workers
570,000 11 states (25-48) 38/thousand workers
1,100,000 10 states (under 25) 19/thousand Workers
* Hearings on S-2864, supra note 9 at 77. Data is for 1966.
TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF STATES: INJURY FREQUENCY RATES IN MANUFAC-
TURING (1965-67)
AND SAFETY ALLOCATION PER NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKER (1967)*
State 1965 1966 1967 Ave (65-6 7) Alloc.Inon-agric. worker
So. Car. 7.6 8.6 8.0 8.1 $.07 42 (rank)
Pa. 10.7 11.2 11.5 11.1 .34 18
Conn. 11.1 11.5 11.8 11.5 .34 16
N.Y. 12.4 13.7 n.a. - .74 5
N.J. 13.1 13.5 n.a. - .44 12
Va. 13.8 13.1 13.2 13.4 .23 26
Ind. 11.5 12.8 15.9 13.4 .05 43
Ala. 13.2 15.6 n.a. - .09 38
Iowa 16.6 16.3 n.a. - .21 28
Texas n.a. n.a. 16.7 - .02 44
Florida 18.7 17.5 19.3 18.5 .30 22
Wisc. 17.6 19.3 19.1 18.6 .51 11
Maine 19.8 21.4 22.0 22.1 .18 33
Ark. n.a. n.a. 35.9 - .40 14
Wym. n.a. n.a. 41.5 - 0 (50)
*From state injury reports; Hearings on S-2864, supra note 9, at 196, 894-943.
Industrial Safety
TABLE 9
INJURY FREQUENCY RATES IN MANUFACTURING,
























Ind. N.Y. Ark. Fla. Pa. Conn. V,
- - - 7.0 8.0 - 9
3.5 11.5 8.6 13.3 8.1 11.5 10
3.5 9.7 4.8 12.5 7.3 9.6 3
4.4 12.3 17.6 7.7 15.0 14.6 14
4.7 6.5 - 1.8 35.7 4.3 -
4.8 12.8 17.4 17.7 7.7 -- -
5.3 9.6 11.2 10.6 6.2 8.9 4
5.7 5.9 6.5 5.1 5.0 8.0 7
8.7 6.6 - 6.3 5.9 8.3 4
11.4 18.2 21.2 13.7 16.0 22.3 8
12.7 10.9 25.3 26.2 13.2 10.4 14
15.7 16.9 38.9 19.3 11.9 6.0 -
15.9 13.7 35.9 19.3 11.8 11.8 13
16.8 19.1 33.1 28.7 14.8 22.1 25
17.1 24.3 52.4 31.7 18.9 16.1 27
17.3 25.8 28.4 30.9 21.5 27.9 25
20.7 19.2 56.0 27.2 9.3 26.4 16
21.9 21.8 27.2 14.8 18.3 11.8 17
30.0 21.8 21.7 16.3 25.5 29.4 -
32.3 13.7 8.4 11.1 12.7 22.4 6
32.3 35.1 67.1 38.8 39.0 24.1 35
*New York Data is for 1966; see the various states injury reports. Underlined are rates
for each of the three industries in each state with the lowest and highest rates.
TABLE 10
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Table 11
A COMPARISON OF REGULATION INFORMATION BETWEEN THE BEST














Stated in Law ..............
(3) Per Cent of Work
Force Covered ................
(4) % Max. Temp. Total
Disab. Benefit, of Wage
(wife, 2 dep. children)
Safety Laws:







(5) Cease & Desist Order
by Safety Dept .................
Safety Enforcement:
(1) Allocation per non-
agricultural worker,
rank among states .............
(2) Size of Inspection
Staff .............................
(3) Number of Wage
earners/staff man ..............
(4) Percentage of Wage
earners covered ................
































* See, Hearings on S-2864, at 195, 197-202, 894-947; Javits, supra note 56.
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APPENDIX B
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968*
A BILL
To authorize the Secretary of Labor to set standards to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for working men and women; to assist the States to participate in
efforts to assure such working conditions; to provide for research, information, education,
and training in the field of occupational safety and health; and for other purposes.
Be in enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 4968-"
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SEC. 2.(a) The Congress finds that-
(1) personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations which result in death
or disability are an increasing source of tragedy and extreme hardship for workers and
their families, and that the number of such industries and illnesses has reached such
sizable proportions in the Nation as to reduce to a serious degree the effectiveness of
the manpower resources in the United States and thereby impose a substantial burden
upon, and a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss,
medical expenses, and disability compensation payments; and
(2) the public health and welfare of the Nation is endangered since occupational
injuries and illnesses involve a large part of the population either as victims of such
injuries and illnesses or as members of the victims' families.
(b) Congress declares it to be the purpose and policy, through the exercise by Congress
of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations and
to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions-
(I) by establishing mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to
businesses affecting commerce;
(2) by providing for the effective enforcement of such safety and health standards;
(3) by providing for research relating to occupational safety and health;
(4) by providing for training programs to increase and improve personnel engaged in
the field of occupational safety and health;
(5) by more clearly delineating the responsibility of the Federal Government in its
activities related to occupational safety and health in the private sector;
(6) by providing grants to the States to assist them in identifying their needs and
responsibilities in the area of occupational safety and health, to develop plans in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, and to conduct experimental and demon-
stration projects in connection therewith;
(7) by providing for appropriate accident and health reporting procedures which will
help achieve the objective of this Act;
(8) BY ESTABLISHING MINIMUM INJURY FREQUENCY RATES FOR
INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO THIS ACT WHICH WILL SERVE AS GOALS TO
BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF SAFETY AND
HEALTH STANDARDS.
* This text includes the author's recommendations, in upper case type. Suggested
deletions are dashed over.
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STANDARDS
SEC. 3.(a) Any employer engaged in a business affecting commerce shall furnish
employment and a place of employment which are safe and healthful and shall comply with
the standards prescribed from time to time by the Secretary after appropriate consultation
with other Federal agencies by rule or regulation for the adoption of practices, means,
methods, operations, conditions, and processes in order to provide safe and healthful
employment and places of employment. ANY EMPLOYER WHO SHALL ACHIEVE
IN ANY PLANT, WORK-PLACE, OR OTHER REPORTING UNIT AS DEFINED
BY THE SECRETARY UNDER SECTION 15 (e) OF THIS ACT AN AVERAGE
INJURY FREQUENCY RATE AT OR LESS THAN THE GOAL RATE SET BY
THE SECRETARY UNDER SECTION 15(f) OF THIS ACT FOR THE APPLI-
CABLE INDUSTRY, SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SECTION.
(b) Section 553 of title 5, United States Code, shall apply to any rulemaking by the
Secretary under subsection (a) of this section.
(c) ANY PERSON, CORPORAION OR OTHER ORGANIZATION WHICH
VENDS ANY MACHINE OR OTHER INSTRUMENTALITY, OR ANY OTHER
MARKETABLE PRODUCTION AGENCY, WHICH WILL BE USED BY ANY
EMPLOYEE OR ANY EMPLOYER SUBJECT TO THIS ACT IN THE PERFORM-
ANCE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES OF THAT EMPLOYEE, SHALL
INCLUDE IN THE CONTRACT OF SALE PERTAINING TO SUCH ITEM A
WARRANTY TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH ITEM COMPLIES WITH ANY
APPLICABLE HEALTH OR SAFETY STANDARDS PRESCRIBED BY THE
SECRETARY UNDER SECTION 3(a) OF THIS ACT.
ADMINISTRATION
SEC. 4. In carrying out his responsibilities under this Act, the Secretary is authorized
to-
(a) appoint, without regard to the civil service laws, such advisory committees or
boards as he deems appropriate;
(b) use, with their consent, the services, facilities, and employees of Federal agencies
with or without reimbursement, and with the consent of any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof, accept and use the services, facilities, and employees of the agencies of
such State or subdivision with or without reimbursement; and
(c) employ experts and consultants or organizations thereof as authorized by section
3109, title 5, United States Code, compensate individuals so employed at rates not in
excess of $100 per diem, including traveltime, and allow them, while away from their
homes or regular places of business, travel expenses (including per diem in lieu of
subsistence) as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code, for persons in
the Government service employed intermittently, while so employed, except that
contracts for such employment may be renewed annually.
INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS
SEC. 5.(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Secretary or his designated
representative, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in
charge, is authorized-
(I) to enter upon at reasonable times any factory; plant, establishment, construction
site, mine, or other areas or workplace or environment subject to the provisions of this
Act; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such placV or environ-
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ment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines; apparatus, devices, equipment,
and materials therein, and to question employees engaged in activities subject to the
provisions of this Act.
(b) For the purpose of carrying out his duties under this Act, the Secretary may delegate
his authority under this section to any agency of the Federal Government with or without
reimbursement, and, with its consent and with or without reimbursement and under
conditions the Secretary may prescribe, to any appropriate State agency or agencies
designated by the Governor of the State.
(c) THE SECRETARY SHALL PROVIDE REGULAR TIME INTERVALS FOR
THE INSPECTION OF ANY REPORTING UNIT SUBJECT TO ACT, SUCH
TIME INTERVALS BEING AS SHORT AS FEASIBLE, AND APPLICABLE TO
ANY AGENCY TO WHICH HE HAS DELEGATED HIS AUTHORITY UNDER
SECTION 5(b) OF THIS ACT.
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
SEC. 6.(a)(1) If, upon inspection or investigation, the Secretary determines that any
person has violated the provisions of this Act or the regulations and standards established
thereunder, he shall hold such hearings, issue such orders, and make such decisions, based
upon findings of fact, as are deemed to be necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act,
and for such purposes the Secretary and the district courts shall have the authority and
jurisdiction provided in section 5 of the Act of June 30, 1936 (ch.881, 49Stat.2036), as
amended.
(2) If an inspection or investigation discloses that a violation may result in imminent
harm to the safety and health of workers, the Secretary or his duly authorized representa-
tive may immediately issue an order providing for the immediate cessation of such
violation and any other measures he may deem necessary to correct or remove such
violation and further, prohibit the employment of any persons in locations or under
conditions where such violations exist, except to correct or remove the violation. Such
order shall remain in effect during the pendency of any subsequent proceeding under
paragraph (1) of this subsection and in the event of any judicial proceeding relating to such
order before the proceeding under paragraph (1) of this subsection the only issue to be
judicially determined shall be the existence of imminent harm to the safety and health of
the workers.
(b) Each employer subject to this Act shall make, keep, and preserve, and make
available to the Secretary such records concerning the requirements of section 3(a) of this
Act, and shall make reports therefrom to the Secretary, as he may prescribe by regulation
or order as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of this Act. EACH SUCH
EMPLOYER SHALL SUBMIT ANNUAL INJURY FREQUENCY RATE DATA
COMPILED AND PRESENTED ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN STAN-
DARD METHOD OF RECORDING AND MEASURING WORK INJURY EX-
PERIENCE AS APPROVED BY THE AMERICAN STANDARDS ASSOCIATION
IN 1954, OF THIS ACT OR ACCORDING TO ANY SYSTEM PRESCRIBED
UNDER SECTION 15(d) AT SUCH TIMES AS THE SECRETARY SHALL RE-
QUIRE.
(c) The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
shall provide for the establishment and supervision of programs for the education and
training of employers and employees in the recognition, avoidance, and prevention of
unsafe working conditions in employments covered by this Act, and to consult with and
advise employers as to effective means of preventing occupational injuries and illnesses.
INJUNCTIONS, JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
SEC. 7.(a) Wherever the Secretary has reason to believe, either on the basis of an
inspection or investigation, that conditions or practices existing in violation of section 3(a)
of this Act, or any rule threrunder, are of such a nature that their immediate correction or
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removal is reasonably required in order to safeguard the safety and health of workers, the
Secretary may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin or restrain the
existence of such conditions or practices. Such relief shall include whatever is necessary to
safeguard the safety and health of persons affected, including the closing of the estab-
lishment or place in question and prohibiting the entry of any person in such establishment
or place, except to correct such conditions or practices. Any suit shall be brought in the
district where the person who is responsible for the existence of such conditions or
practices resides or transacts business.
(b) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enforce any order
of the Secretary under section 6 of this Act, and any person aggrieved by such order may
obtain review thereof by such courts based upon the record before the Secretary.
(c) THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL HAVE JU-
RISDICTION TO REVIEW CLAIMS BY EMPLOYERS SUBJECT TO THIS ACT
THAT THE SECRETARY IS NOT ACTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
REFUSING TO GRANT VARIATION, TOLERANCE, EXEMPTION, OR SUB-
SIDY UNDER SECTION II OF THIS ACT.
(d) ANY EMPLOYEE OF ANY EMPLOYER, SUBJECT TO THIS ACT, SHALL
BE ENTITLED TO BRING ANY ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR IN THE COURTS OF THE VARIOUS
STATES. THIS ACTION MUST BE BASED UPON EXPOSURE TO HAZARD-
OUS CONDITIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT,
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE EMPLOYER IS DEEMED TO HAVE COM-
PLIED WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT BY VIRTUE OF ATTAINMENT
OF THE GOAL FREQUENCY RATE IN THAT EMPLOYEE'S REPORTING
UNIT UNDER SECTION 3(a) OF THIS ACT.
INADMISSIBILITY AS EVIDENCE: CONFIDENTIALITY OF
TRADE SECRETS
SEC. 8.(a) No record or determination of any administrative proceeding under this Act
or any statement or report of any kind obtained or received in connection with the
administration or enforcement of the provisions of this Act shall be made available to any
third party or admitted or used as evidence in any civil action growing out of any matter
mentioned in such record, determination, statement, or report, other than an action for
enforcement or review under this Act; and
(b) In connection with any proceeding under this Act no witness or any other person
shall be required to divulge trade secrets or secret processes.
PENALTIES
SEC. 9.(a) Any person who violates, or fails or refuses to comply with, section 3(a) of
this Act, any rule issued under section 3(a) of this Act, or any order issued under section 6
of this Act, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each such
violation. Each violation of such provisions or rules or order shall be a separate offense,
except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect to comply with
such provisions or rules or an order of the Secretary, each day of continuance of such
failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representative is authorized to assess the civil penalties under this section. He may, upon
application therefor, remit or mitigate any forfeiture provided for under this section and
he shall have the authority to determine the facts upon all such applications.
(b) Penalties under this section shall be collected by the Secretary or by his duly
authorized representative unless a district court determines that an order of the Secretary
issued under section 6(a) (2) would not result in imminent harm to the safety and health of
the workers.
(c) Any person who wilfully violates or fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of
section 3(a) of this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
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punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; except that if the conviction is for a
violation committed after a first conviction of such person, punishment shall be by a fine of
not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.
(d) Any person who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interfers
with any person while engaged in or on account of the performance of inspections or
investigatory duties under this Act shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both. Whoever, in the commission of any such acts, uses a
deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both. Whoever kills any person while engaged in or on account of the
performance of inspecting or investigating duties under this Act shall be punished as
provided under sections I I I I and 1114 of title 18, United States Code.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
SEC. 10.(a) Each contract or subcontract exceeding $2,500 and requiring or involving
the employment of any person (1) to which the United States or any agency or in-
strumentality thereof, or the District of Columbia is a party, (2) which is made for or on
behalf of the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or the District of
Columbia or (3) which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants from, or loans
insured or guaranteed by, the United States or any agency or instrumentality of the United
States, shall include the requirement that no part of such contract will be performed in any
place or under any conditions which do not meet the standards issued by the Secretary
under section 3(a) of this Act.
(b) In establishing standards under section 3(a) of this Act, the Secretary shall to the
extent feasible conform to such standards and those safety and health standards promul-
gated under other laws administered by him.
(c) In addition to the remedies otherwise provided in this Act, the Secretary of Labor
may declare ineligible to receive any contracts subject to this Act any person or firm, or
any firm, corporation, partnership, or association in which such person or firm has a
controlling interest, which is found to have disregarded its obligations under this Act until
such person or firm has satisfied the Secretary that it will comply with the requirements of
this Act.
(d) In addition to the remedies otherwise provided in this Act, the Secretary may
recommend to the appropriate contracting agency that such agency cancel, terminate,
suspend, or cause to be canceled, or suspended, any contract made by any contracting
agency for the failure of an employer who is a contractor or subcontractor to comply with
the order of the Secretary issued under section 6 of this Act for the breach or violation by
such employer of the requirements under subsection (a) of this section.
(e) This section shall not apply to any contract to be performed in a workplace within a
foreign country or within any territory under the jurisdiction of the United States, except
within a State, as that term is defined in section 20(f) of this Act.
VARIATIONS, TOLERANCES, AND EXEMPTIONS
SEC. 1I. The Secretary may provide such reasonable limitations and may make such
rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, tolerances, and exemptions to and
from any or all provisions of this Act as he may find necessary and proper in the public
interest or to avoid serious impairment of the conduct of Government business. NO
EXEMPTIONS SHALL BE BASED SOLELY UPON THE FINANCIAL IN-
ABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER TO COMPLY WITH ANY OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS ACT. THE SECRETARY SHALL, UPON APPLICATION BY ANY
EMPLOYER WITHIN SIXTY DAYS OF THE ISSUANCE OF ANY STANDARD
UNDER SECTION 3(a) OF THIS ACT, GRANT AN APPROPRIATE SUBSIDY
FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THAT STANDARD SHOULD
HE FIND IN HIS DISCRETION THAT SUCH EMPLOYER IS ECONOMICALLY
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UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS FOR REASONS OTHER
THAN ITS OWN BUSINESS INEFFICIENCY OR DISADVANTAGEOUS FI-
NANCIAL CONDITION. The Secretary shall keep an appropriately indexed record of
all variations, tolerances, and exemptions AND SUBSIDIES, granted under this section,
which shall be open for public inspection.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
SEC. 12.(a) The Secretary may, in his discretion, by rule or order decline to assert
jurisdiction over any occupational safety or health issue, or class or category of such issue,
governed by any State law whenever in his opinion the provisions of such State law and
their enforcement would reasonably carry out the objectives of this Act.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall prevent or bar any State agency or court from assuming and
asserting jurisdiction over any occupational safety or health issue within five hundred and
forty-five days following the effective date of this Act and thereafter over any such issue
over which the Secretary declines to assert jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FEDERAL PROGRAMS
SEC. 13. Nothing in this Act shall authorize the Secretary to regulate, or shall apply to,
working conditions of employees with respect to whom another Federal agency has
statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational
safety and health. The Secretary shall coordinate, to the greatest extent practicable, the
occupational safety and health activities of all Federal agencies.
APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 14. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to
carry out this Act.
RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
SEC. 15(a)(I) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall from time to time
consult with the Secretary in order to develop specific plans for such research, demonstra-
tions, and experiments as are necessary to produce criteria enabling the Secretary to meet
his responsibility for the formulation of safety and health standards under this Act; and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, on the basis of such research, demonstra-
tions, and experiments and any other information available to him, shall develop such
criteria.
(b) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is authorized to make inspections
as provided in section 5 of this Act in order to carry out his functions and responsibilities
under this section.
(c) The Secretary of Labor is authorized to enter into contracts, agreements, or other
arrangements with appropriate public agencies or private organizations for the purpose of
conducting studies related to his responsibilities for establishing and applying occupational
safety and health standards under section 3 of this Act. In carrying out his responsibilities
under this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare in order to avoid any duplication of efforts under this section.
(d) the Secretary SHALL UTILIZE THE AMERICAN STANDARD METHOD
OF RECORDING AND MEASURING WORK INJURY EXPERIENCE, AS PRO-
VIDED BY SECTION 6(b) OF THIS ACT, OR, after consultation with the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, shall MAY establish such accident and health reporting
system for employers and for the States " IF he deems SUCH OTHER SYSTEMS
necessary to carry out his responsibilities under this Act.
(e) THE SECRETARY SHALL DEFINE APPROPRIATE OCCUPATIONAL
UNITS FOR PURPOSES OF REPORTING UNDER SECTION 6(b) OF THIS ACT




(f) THE SECRETARY SHALL ESTABLISH INJURY FREQUENCY RATES TO
SERVE AS GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED BY THIS ACT FOR EACH INDUSTRY
ANY EMPLOYER OF WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THIS ACT.
SEC. 16.(a) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, after consultation with
the Secretary of Labor and with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
conduct (directly or by grants or contracts) educational programs to provide an adequate
supply of personnel to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(b) The Secretary is also authorized to conduct (directly or by grants or contracts)
short-term training or personnel engaged in work related to his responsibilities under this
Act.
GRANTS TO THE STATES
SEC. 17.(a) The Secretary is authorized during the period beginning J4y- 1-, 49.68, and
ending J umn 3.,--9;, to make grants to the States to assist them in identifying their needs
and responsibilities in the area of occupational safety and health and to develop plans for-
(I) establishing systems for the collection of information concerning the nature and
frequency of occupational injuries and diseases;
(2) increasing the expertise and enforcement capabilities of their personnel engaged
in occupational safety and health programs; and
(3) otherwise improving the administration and enforcement of State occupational
safety and health laws, including standards thereunder, consistent with the objectives of
this Act.
(b) The Secretary is authorized during the period beginning Ju.y--%, and ending
.14we-.3Q -94., to make grants to the States for experimental and demonstration projects
consistent with the objectives set forth in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) of
this section.
(c) The Governor of the State shall designate the appropriate State agency, or agencies,
for receipt of any grant made by the Secretary under this section.
(d) Any State agency, or agencies, designated by the Governor of the State, desiring a
grant under this section shall submit an application therefor to the Secretary.
(e) The Secretary shall review the application, and shall, after consultation with the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, approve or reject such application.
(f) As a condition for any grant under this section the State must agree to comply with
the reporting and accounting requirements which the Secretary shall from time to time
prescribe by rule or regulation to assure that monies expended thereunder are in furthe-
rance of the purposes of this section.
(g) The Federal share for each State grant under this section may be up to 90 per
centum of the State's total cost.
(h) Prior to 4ue-.30, 7.9-, the Secretary shall, after consultation with the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, transmit a report to the President and to Congress,
describing the experience under the program and making any recommendations as he may
deem appropriate.
EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS
SEC. 18. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any way
other Federal laws prescribing safety and health requirements.
AUDITS
SEC. 19. The Comptroller General of the United States, or any of his duly authorized
representatives, shall have access for the purpose of audit and examinations to any books,





SEC. 20. Within one hundred and twenty days following the convening of the first
session of each Congress, the Secretary and the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare shall jointly prepare and submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress a
biennial report upon the subject matter of this Act, the progress concerning the achieve-
ment of its purposes, the needs and requirements in the field of occupational safety and
health, and any other relevant information, and including any recommendations they may
deem appropriate.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 21.(a) The term "Secretary" appearing in this Act means the Secretary of Labor
or his duly authorized representatives.
(b) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or commu-
nication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or
within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States, or between points in
the same State but through a point outside thereof.
(c) The term "person" means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corpo-
rations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized groups of persons.
(d) The term "employer" means a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who
has employees and includes any person acting directly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee, but does not include the United States or any State or political
subdivision of a State or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer),
or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
(e) The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer.
(f) The term "State" includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and possessions of the United States.
SEPARABILITY
SEC. 22. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person
or circumstance, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application of such
provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected thereby.
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